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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JANE WALTERS,

~——~'-'""

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v
Case No. 890671 CA
Category 15

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION and NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal by virtue
of Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code,
This matter originated as an action for divorce brought by
Plaintiff in her Complaint and by Defendant in his Counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this brief are:
1. Did the trial court properly divide and distribute the
parties' property?
2. Does Appellant have standing to appeal from the trial
court's distribution of realty?
3. Was Respondent entitled to the trial court's award of
$1,000.00 as and for her reasonable attorney's fees?

1

4. Is Respondent entitled to her reasonable attorneyfs fees
incurred in responding to Appellant's appeal?
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The statutory law that is determinative to the issues
presented in this brief are:
30-3-3* Temporary alimony and suit money.
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk a sum of
money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party
and the children, and to enable such party to prosecute or defend
the action.
30-3-5 Disposition of Property - Maintenance and health care of the
parties and children - Court to have continuing jurisdiction Custody and visitation - Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious
petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
and parties
UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; ... Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses
UTAH RULES OP APPELLATE PROCEDURE, Rule 33. Damages for delay or
frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court
determines that a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages and
single or double costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the
prevailing party.

2

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
A. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL LEVEL
Trial was held on 7 February, 1989, in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah County, the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Sr.,
Judge. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court
issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION on 15 February, 1989, addressing the
major issues of the case and directing counsel to file affidavits
regarding attorney fees. The Courtfs MEMORANDUM DECISION of 31 July
awarded Plaintiff $1,000.00 as and for her reasonable attorney's
fees. The Court entered its DECREE on 13 October, 1989, and its
AMENDED DECREE on 30 October, 1989.
B. RELEVANT PACTS
(All references in this section are to pages and lines of the
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, TRIAL, i.e. 6:13-7:22 is a
reference to page 6, line 13 through page 7, line 22 of the
transcript.)
Plaintiff, Helen Jayne (Hunter) Walters [Helen], and
Defendant, Lewis Mark Walters [Mark], were married on 5 October,
1984, [3:10-25]. They separated when Helen bout this action in 1987
[11:10-11]. Trial on Helen's Complaint for Divorce was held on 7
February, 1989.
The parties originally met in late 1978, slightly less than 6
years prior to their marriage [29:10-32:8; Plaintiff's Exhibit #4].
At the time they met Helen lived in a mobile home situated in Orem
[14:1-15:9]. Shortly after they met the parties began living
3

together in Helen's mobile home in Orem [17:9-19:2; 3 2:22-33:6;
34:4-35:9; Plaintiff's Exhibit #4]. For a brief time Mark"s son
lived with them in Orem [32:22-33:6]. Mark and Helen lived in the
trailer in Orem until 1980 when they moved it to a pad Mark
purchased in a trailer park in Pleasant Grove, situated at 62 5
South 50 West [35:10-36:5].
Helen was employed at Geneva Steel from before the time they
met through the time of the trial, except for a time when the plant
temporarily ceased operations in 1981 and 1982 [36:14-37:7]. Mark
was employed at Hill Air Force Base from 1967 through the date of
the trial [84:19-85:2]. His work sometimes took him out of state on
temporary duty assignments. Mark earned a retirement benefit as a
result of his employment [85:3-86:2].
Between his temporary assignments Mark's base of employment
was at Hill and his home was Helen's trailer [52:25-53:18]. For the
years 1979 through 1983, the years the parties cohabited but prior
to the parties' marriage, Mark listed his permanent address on his
federal income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove,
the site of the trailer he occupied with Helen [75:4-8; 76:10-14].
Helen had a minor daughter, Shantel, who was 12 years old at
the time of trial and who had lived with Mark in the parties1
trailer home from the time the parties first met when she was not
quite three [39:23-40:18; 59:18-20]. Prior to their marriage the
4

parties agreed that Shantel would use the sir name of Walters at
school and church rather than Helen's sir name [40:22-43:25]. Mark
shared responsibility for the financial support of Shantel [59:I860: 16] • Mark listed Shantel as a dependent living with him on his
1982, 1983, and 1984 federal income tax returns [77:2-78:17].
Before they were married, Mark also helped Helen pay for certain
debts she had accumulated, testifying that he "[d]idn't expect
nothing [in return]" [86:3-88:10].
Shortly before the parties met, Mark began purchasing a parcel
of realty in Highland, Utah [94:15-24]. Mark kept a second mobile
home on this property from before the time the parties met through
October, 1985, when he moved the trailer to a second trailer pad he
purchased at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, near the site of
the parties1 home [100:20-101:5]. This second trailer, while
situated in Highland, was variously described by witnesses as
either "unlivable" [24:22-25:25], occupied by a renter [27:1228:4], or used for storage [53:19-54:17], but never as Mark's
residence [63:5-12].
From the time that Helen's trailer was moved to the pad in
Pleasant Grove in 1980 through and after the time Mark's trailer
was moved from Highland to the neighboring pad in Pleasant Grove,
the parties pooled their monies and efforts to improve the three
properties with an eye toward eventually using the value of the two
5

trailer properties to invest in building a home in Highland [56:423; 64:9-65:7; 114:14-115:25]. When Helen was laid off from Geneva,
Mark felt it would be better if she didnft seek substitute work
because her efforts were needed to maintain and improve their
properties [45:4-23].
They made numerous improvements to the property on which
Helen's trailer was placed, including concrete driveways and outbuildings [96:20-97:7]. Mark financed most of these improvements
while Helen arranged for, supervised, and participated in the work
[37:15-39:3; Plaintiff's Exhibit #4]. Helen's earnings were spent
on utilities, groceries, and "keeping things in the home front
going" [39:4-19]. They built a large utility building on the
Highland property [83:9-16]. Again, Helen arranged for and
participated in the work of laying the pad and water line, erecting
the building, and installing solar heating [45:24-46:13; 55:14-21].
All of the real property was purchased in Mark's name only,
even the trailer pad bought after the marriage [60:17-61:13].
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENTS
1. Contrary to Appellant's argument that the trial court
improperly distributed the parties' property (principally
Appellant's realty and retirement benefits) by erroneously applying
Section 3 0-1-4.5, Utah Code, to the facts of this case, the trial
court properly distributed the property under authority of Section
6

30-3-5, Utah Code. It was proper for the trial court to enter a
finding that the parties lived in a "marriage-like" relationship
prior to solemnization of their marriage. This finding was not a
conclusion of law erroneously denominated as a finding of fact.
Appellant has not marshalled all facts in support of such finding
and demonstrated that the finding is clearly erroneous.
2. Appellant does not have standing to appeal from the trial
courtfs award to Respondent of interests in his real property as he
has transferred his interests in such realty prior to this appeal.
3. The trial court properly awarded Respondent $1,000.00 as
and for her reasonable attorney fees. Respondent established a need
for such award in her counsel's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES. Her assertion of such need was not challenged by Appellant.
4. Respondent is entitled to an award of her reasonable
attorney fees incurred to respond to Appellant's appeal, either by
virtue of Section 30-3-3, Utah Code or by virtue of Rule 33(a) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISTRIBUTED THE PARTIES1 PROPERTY
Appellant argues the trial court erred when it awarded realty
to Respondent that was held in his name only and was acquired by
him prior to the date the parties were married. Appellant likewise
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challenges the trial court's award to Respondent of a share of his
retirement benefits earned after the parties1 began living together
but prior to their marriage. Appellant theorizes that the trial
court made such awards pursuant to Section 30-1-4.5, Utah's "common
law marriage" statute.
The court used the phrase "marriage-like relationship" in its
first MEMORANDUM DECISION and in the FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to describe the parties1 relationship from the
time it found they fist cohabited (1 January, 198 0) until they were
married on 5 October, 1984. Appellant relies almost exclusively on
the use of this phrase for his conclusion that the court applied
Section 30-1-4.5 to its decision to make the awards to Appellant.
Interestingly, no citation to that section appears anywhere in the
record. Respondent didn't plead for relief under the section;
neither party argued for or against its application; and the trial
court made no mention of the section either in its MEMORANDUM
DECISION or in the FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Nevertheless, Appellant urges that the trial court's finding
that the parties maintained a "marriage-like relationship" prior to
their marriage was a misapplication of the common law marriage
statute and as such was actually an erroneous conclusion of law
disguised as a finding of fact which this court should review for
correctness. Appellant cites to Layton v Layton, 777 P2nd 504- (Utah
8

App. 1989), for the various reason why Section 30-1-4.5 cannot
legally apply to the facts of this case.
However, in using the phrase, the trial court was neither
explicitly nor implicitly attempting to legitimize the parties1
common law relationship. Rather, it was characterizing the nature
of their pre-marital relationship and the extent to which they
joined their efforts and earnings to acquire and improve their
assets both before and after their marriage. This is evidenced by
the court's reference to the various facts supporting this finding
in paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact. The court correctly and
properly made a finding of fact when it described the partiesf
relationship.
The facts of this case more closely parallel the facts of
Barber v Barber. 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah App. 1990) than they
do the facts of Lavton. In Layton the parties never married and
Respondent had been awarded property based on retroactive
application of Section 30-1-4.5. In Barber the parties lived
together for approximately two years then married. As in this case,
in Barber apparently neither party raised Section 3 0-1-4.5 as a
ground for relief. This court held in Barber that the party seeking
to prevent the equitable division of property interests acquired
prior to the marriage "completely ignores the fact that these
parties were eventually married, and it is well settled that
9

premarital or separate property may, under proper circumstances, be
subject to equitable division upon divorce."
"In dividing a marital estate, the trial court has
considerable discretion to enter equitable orders concerning
property distribution." Haumont v Haumont, 135 Utah Ad. Rep. 59
(Utah App. 1990). l "It is well settled that there is no fixed
formula for the division of marital property, but that the trial
court has the power to divide property and income so that the
parties may readjust their lives to their new circumstances as well
as possible." Munns v Munns, 790 P2nd 116 (Utah App 1990). 2 "The
overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable
—

that property be fairly divided between the parties, given their

contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the
time of the divorce." Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P2nd 1276 (Utah
1987). "Certainly, our Supreme Court in analyzing traditional
property distributions has never limited a wife to recovering only
what she monetarily contributed to the marriage." Huck v Huck, 73 4
P2nd 417 (Utah 1986); Martinez v Martinez, 754 P2nd 69 (Utah App.
1988) .

1

At least twelve additional cases decided by this Court and
three decided by the Utah Supreme Court have made the same ruling
since 1987.
2

This Court has pronounced this same goal in at least nine
cases since 1987, the Utah Supreme Court in at least three.
10

The Utah Supreme Court specifically addressed the trial
courtfs authority to divide separate property in Burke v Burke, 73 3
P2nd 133 (Utah 1987) reasoning as follows3:
Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be
viewed as separate property, and in appropriate
circumstances, equity will require that each party retain
the separate property brought to the marriage. Preston v
Preston, 646 P2nd 705 (Utah 1982). However the rule is
not invariable. Workman v Workman, 652 P2nd 931 (Utah
1982) . In fashioning an equitable property division,
trial courts need consider all of the pertinent
circumstances. Enalert v Enalert, 576 P2nd 1274 (Utah
1978). The factors generally to be considered are the
amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the
property was acquired before or during the marriage; the
source of the property; the health of the parties; the
parties1 standard of living, respective financial
conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the duration of
the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties1
ages at the time of the marriage and of divorce; what the
parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary
relationship the property division has with the amount of
alimony and child support to be awarded, [citations] Of
particular concern in a case such as this is whether one
spouse has made contribution toward the growth of the
separate assets of the other spouse and whether the
assets accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of
the parties. Preston supra.
In accordance with Burke, the trial court had before it
several fact from which it made specific findings why it was
equitable that portions of the separate property of Mark be
distributed to Helen including: the trailer home awarded to Helen

3

On at least eleven occasions since 1987 this court has
recognized the principal allowing for distribution of separate
property in appropriate circumstances; the Utah Supreme Court has
done so in at least five cases since 1987.
11

had been her home and the home of her minor daughter, Shantel,
since before the parties became acquainted;

after the trailer home

had been moved to Mark's pad in Pleasant Grove, it was the only
home from which Shantel has attended school and church; the value
of all of Mark's separate properties were enhanced by the joint
efforts of both parties; Helen contributed her labor and her money
to the value of mark's separate properties; Helen contributed her
monies to keeping the "home front" going allowing Mark to
contribute his earnings to improvements on his properties.
The findings which support an award of some of Mark's separate
property to Helen also support the finding that the parties' premarital relationship was "marriage-like". Appellant takes issue
with the use of the phrase but does not address the substance of
the findings which support the awards to Helen.
However, Utah appellate courts have proclaimed on several
occasions that "[w]e will not set aside a trial court's findings of
fact unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence or we
otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made," Smith v Linmar Energy Corp., 132 Utah Ad. Rep. 52 (Utah
App. 1990), "and we give due regard to the trial court's
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Terry v
Price Mun. Corp., 784 P2nd 146 (Utah 1989). "A finding is clearly
erroneous, whether the action is in equity or in law, id., only if
12

without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous
view of the law." Linmar, supra. Cited in Williams v Miller, 136
Utah Ad. Rep. 32 (Utah App. 1990).4
"An appealing party bears the burden of establishing that ...
the trial court's factual findings upon which the [property]
division is grounded are clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a). Sorensen v Sorensen, 769 P2nd 820 (Utah App.
1989) ; Stevens v Stevens, 754 P2nd 952 (Utah App. 1988). "To mount
a successful attack on the trial courtfs factual findings, an
appellant must marshall all the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings and then demonstrate that, even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence
is insufficient to support the findings, Scharf v BMG Corp., 7 00
P2nd 1068 (Utah 1985), or that its findings are otherwise clearly
erroneous." Schindler v Schindler, 776 P2nd 84 (Utah App. 1989);
Riche v Riche. 784 P2nd 465 (Utah App. 1989); Barber, supra; State
v Mooseman. 135 Utah Ad. Rep. 28 (Utah 1990); Williams v Miller,
supra.
Appellant has neither mounted all evidence in support of the
trial court's findings that Helen is entitled to her property

4

This court has recognized this standard of review of
Findings of Fact in relation to property awards in divorces in at
least twenty two cases since 1987; the Utah Supreme Court has done
so in at least five cases in that period.
13

awards nor demonstrated that, even in the light most favorable to
the findings they are insufficient to support those awards. Without
such marshalling and demonstration this court should not set aside
the trial court's findings.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT IS WITHOUT STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S
DISTRIBUTION OP REALTY
Trial in this matter was held on 7 February, 1989. The trial
court issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION on 15 february, 1989. On 28
February, 1989, Mark transferred to Stan Sapp, by Warranty Deed,
all of his interests in the realty situated in Highland and awarded
to him in the MEMORANDUM DECISION. On 31 March, 1989, Mark QuitClaimed to Vera L. Walters all of his interests in the real
property situated in the trailer court in Pleasant Grove upon which
Helen's trailer was placed and which was awarded to Helen in the
MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Also on 31 March, 1989, Mark transferred to

Vera L. Walters, by Warranty Deed, all of his interests in the
other trailer lot situated in the trailer court in Pleasant Grove
and awarded to him in the MEMORANDUM DECISION (see Addendum). The
court's DECREE OF DIVORCE was entered on 13 October, 1989. The
court's AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE was entered on 30 October, 1989,
which amended the original Decree only by adding the words "but
excepting" in paragraph 10 to clarify the court's ruling regarding

14

disposition of the parties1 personal property. Appellant's NOTICE
OF APPEAL was filed on 9 October, 1989.
n

[E]ither party, or even the court on its own motion, may

properly raise standing for the first time on appeal." Wade v
Burke, 131 Utah Ad. Rep. 94 (Utah App. 1990); Blodaett v Zions
First National Bank, 752 P2nd 901 (Utah App. 1988); Terracor v Utah
Bd. of State Lands. 716 P2nd 796 (Utah 1986); Utah Restaurant
Ass'n. v Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P2nd 1159 (Utah 1985);
Health Tecna Corp. v Sound Sys. Int'l., Inc., 588 P2nd 169 (Utah
1978). "The Utah Supreme Court has established three tests to
determine whether a litigant has standing. Blodgett, supra;
Terracor, supra; Jenkins v Swan, 675 P2nd 1145 (Utah 1983).
(1) The party must be able to show that he or she
has suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives
him or her a personal stake in the outcome of the legal
dispute. (2) If the party does not have standing under
the first criterion, he or she may have standing if no
one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the
case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all
unless that particular party has standing to raise the
issue. (3) Even though the party may not have standing
under the first two criteria, he or she may,
nevertheless, have standing if the issues are unique and
of such great public importance that they ought to be
decided in the furtherance of the public interest.
Blodaett, supra; Terracor, supra; If a party does not
qualify under any of these three tests, we will not
render an advisory opinion, but will dismiss the action.
See Redwood Gym v Salt Lake County Comm'n., 624 P2nd 1138
(Utah 1981); Wade, supra.
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In this case Mark stands in a similar position as Ms, Purcell
in Blodaett who quit-claimed her interests in the disputed property
prior to bringing her appeal and was found to have no standing. His
position is also similar to Mr. Burkefs in Wade who claimed no
interest in disputed property and acquired none as a result of the
trial court's judgment and also was found to have no standing. As
with Ms. Purcell and Mr. Burke, Mark now has no personal stake in
the disputed real properties sufficient to confer standing under
the first criterion. As with Mr. Burke, neither does Mark qualify
under the second prong of the standing test because he has no
greater interest in the disputed property than the present record
title holders, Vera L. Walters and Stan Sapp. Thirdly, as this is a
private dispute, it does not carry "sufficient public importance to
confer standing upon appellant under the final prong." Wade, supra.
Standing is properly raised for the first time in this brief.
Because Mark has no standing to appeal the trial court's rulings
concerning the real property he has previously transferred to third
parties, this court can only issue an advisory opinion regarding
interests in the realty and should not entertain his appeal as it
regards such realty.
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POINT III
RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO THE TRIAL COURT1S AWARD TO HER OP
$1000.00 AS AND FOR HER REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES
Appellant contests the trial court's award of $1,000.00 to
Helen for attorney fees claiming she did not establish her need for
the award. However, Appellant's challenge to the trial court's
award of attorney fees to Respondent fails for two reasons.
First, Appellant has waived his right to challenge the award
by his failure to lodge his objection below. He cannot raise the
issue anew in this appeal. This court has recently cited with
authority the general rule that "'[i]t would be manifestly unjust
to permit a party to sit silently by, believing that prejudicial
error has been committed' and then 'if he loses, come forward1
claiming error." Onyeabor v Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P2nd 525 (Utah
App. 1990), citing Hill v Cloward, 377 P2nd 186 (Utah 1962). See
also, Cunningham v Cunningham, 690 P2nd 549 (Utah 1984); Edgar v
Wagner, 572 P2nd 405 (Utah 1977); In Re Ekker, 432 P2nd 45 (Utah
1967). 5

5

Several recent cases involving appeals from criminal
convictions have also applied this rule requiring preservation of
issues for appeal. See, State v Carter, 707 P2nd 656 (Utah 1985);
State v Arroyo, 770 P2nd 153 (Utah App. 1989); State v Johnson,
774 P2nd 1141 (Utah 1989); State v Schlosser, 774 P2nd 1132 (Utah
1989); State v Pacheco, 778 P2nd 26 (Utah App. 1989); State v Webb,
790 P2nd 65 (Utah App. 1990); State v Marshall. 132 Utah Ad. Rep.
45 (Utah App. 1990).
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In this matter, at the direction of the trial court as
indicated in its first MEMORANDUM DECISION, Respondent's counsel
submitted an affidavit setting forth the basis, amount, and
justification for attorney's fees. Appellant made no objection to
the affidavit and claimed no error at the trial level as regards
the claim or the award of attorney's fees. As Appellant has failed
to preserve this claim of error now raised for the first time in
this appeal, this court should refuse to address the claim.
Second, should this court decide Appellant has properly
preserved this claim, it must determine if Respondent established a
need for the award. Appellant has argued that because Respondent
admitted in the affidavit that she was totally self supportive from
her earnings at Geneva Steel and because the trial court found that
neither party was in need of the continuing financial support of
the other "either in the form of alimony or child support," she was
not in need of the award. In so arguing, Appellant is equating the
need required for an award of alimony with need required for the
award of attorney's fees. Appellant cites no cases in support of
that proposition. And, while this court has issued many cases
addressing attorney's fees in domestic cases, none seems to have
specifically stated what quantum of need is necessary to support
such an award. It therefore appears that Appellant's burden in this
regard is to establish that the trial court's finding that
18

Respondent needed the award was "clearly erroneous" in the manner
set forth in Point I hereinabove. Appellant has failed to do so and
the trial court's finding should be sustained.
POINT IV
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OP HER REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES
INCURRED TO RESPOND TO APPELLANT'S APPEAL
In the recent past this court has ruled on the issue of
awarding attorney fees incurred on appeal, variously basing its
decision to grant or deny an award either on the general authority
of Section 30-3-3, Utah Code, or on Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure as a sanction for a frivolous appeal.
In Porco v Porco, 752 P2nd 365 (Utah App. 1988) this court
ruled sanctions should be imposed for a frivolous appeal when
an appeal is obviously without merit and has been
taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and
results in delayed implementation of the judgment of the
lower court; increased costs of litigation; and
dissipation of the time and resources of the Law Court,
[citation] Therefore,we award costs and attorney fees on
appeal to [respondent].
The Porco court so ruled even though it "recognize[d] that
sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious
cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal
erroneous lower court decisions."
Likewise, in Fife v Fife, 777 P2nd 512 (Utah App. 1989),
Barber, supra, and Hurt v Hurt, 136 Utah Ad. Rep. 3 6 (Utah App.
1990) this court imposed sanctions in the form of attorney fees
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incurred on appeal because of frivolous appeals. In Hurt this court
found the appeal to be only partially frivolous. All of these four
cases were remanded for a determination of the amount to be
awarded. In none of these four cases was this court concerned with
the respondent's need for the award.
In contrast, when this court has awarded fees under Section
3 0-3-3 it has done so only when the respondent has established both
need for and reasonableness of the fees incurred. In Rasband v
Rasband, 752 P2nd 1313 (Utah App. 1988) this court found that the
award of attorney fees below was proper but remanded for the trial
court to determine both the need for and reasonableness of the fees
incurred on appeal. It instructed that if the trial court found
both factors it should make an award under 3 0-3-3.
Later, in Mauahan v Maughan, 770 P2nd 156 (Utah App, 1989),
Weston v Weston, 773 P2nd 408 (Utah App. 1989), and Ostler v
Ostler, 789 P2nd 713 (Utah App. 1990), this court remanded only for
a determination because respondent had already established need
below.
In four cases this court has refused to award attorney fees
for appeal; each for a different reason. In Riche, supra, the
respondent was denied attorney fees below. But, because respondent
made a credible argument that her financial condition had
deteriorated since trial, the matter was remanded with instructions
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to determine if there had been a change of circumstances since the
trial. If the trial court so found, it was to then determine and
award a reasonable amount. In Baashaw v Bacrshaw, 788 P2nd 1057
(Utah App.1990), this court denied an award of attorney fees for
appeal because the trial court had denied an award below and
respondent had not shown a asserted a change of circumstances since
trial. In Munns, supra, this court found that the appeal was not
frivolous and awarded no attorney fees. Apparently respondent made
no request for an award under 30-3-3. In Haumont, supra, this court
denied an award of attorney fees on appeal although the trial court
had awarded respondent a portion of her attorney fees below. This
court did so because it had found that the trial court had abused
its discretion in its award of attorney fees.
Here, Respondent seeks an award of her reasonable attorney
fees incurred in this appeal under Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, as this appeal is frivolous as defined by
Porco. Under this Rule Respondent seeks either the entire amount of
her reasonable fees or such amount as may be determined to have
been incurred for that portion of the appeal that this court finds
frivolous, if this court finds the appeal only partially frivolous
as per Hurt.
Alternatively, Respondent seeks an award of her reasonable
attorney fees incurred in this appeal under the court's general
21

authority pursuant to Section 30-3-3. If this court determines that
this Section is the appropriate vehicle for the award, it is urged
that this case closely parallels Mauahan, Weston, and Ostler in
that the trial court has already determined Respondent's need for
the award and this court need only remand for a determination of
the reasonable amount to be awarded.
CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the findings and judgment of the
trial court, award Respondent her reasonable attorney's fees
incurred to respond to Appellantfs appeal, under either Rule 3 3(a)
or Section 30-3-3, and remand for a determination of the reasonable
amount of such award.
Dated this 6th day of July, 1990.

T^^—Thomas H. Means
Attorney for Respondent

22

ADDENDUM
First MEMORANDUM DECISION
Second MEMORANDUM DECISION
FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
QUITCLAIM DEED
WARRANTY DEED (Lot 11, Plat "D", Pleasant Grove Mobile Home
Estates)
WARRANTY DEED (Highland property)
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

F[;? / p
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OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
*********************

HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

-vs-

CV 87 2408

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*********************

The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement,
will rule at this time.
The Court finds that the parties

in this action are

residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction.

Each

of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds
of irreconcilable differences.
exist.

The Court finds that such grounds

The Court will not award alimony to either party.
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when

the marital relationship between the parties began.

The Court

finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties
began

to

carry

on

a

marriage

like

relationship

on

or

about

January 1, 1980, which was several years, before the marriage was
actually solemnized.
The Court considered a number of factors in determining
that the marital relationship began in 1980.
fact that the defendant stayed

Among these is the

in the plaintifffs trailer with

her when he was not working out of state.

The defendant had the

plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and
did

not charge

rent.

The plaintiff

made

improvements

on

the

property such as would be expected of a married couple.
The
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission.
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state,
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January
1st, 1980.
This is an approximate date because the Court does
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date.
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff is
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit
is found in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the
defendant retires.
If for any reason the defendant does not
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to
be filed with the defendant's employer which will give the
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff.
The formula which should be used in the order is "one half of his
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator
consists of the number of years or months they were married
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government
and the denominator is the total number of years or months
defendant was in such employment."
Marchant, at 206.
The
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires. If
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they
may wish to consider a cash settlement of the retirement
benefits.

The real property which is at issue was partially
acquired before the marriage, and partially after. Considering
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for,
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the
real property.
The plaintiff is to receive the property in
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear.
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove property
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that
property.
The Court finds that this is a fair division of the
property which was either acquired or paid for during the
marriage.
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those.
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account,
and $2750.00 of the America First account.
The Court has no evidence of values with which to
divide the disputed personal property of the parties.
The
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a
division of property between themselves, or having one party
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and
the proceeds divided.
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees
upon submission of affidavits by counsel.
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the
Court for signature.

Dated this 15th day of February, 1989
BY

cc:

Robert L. Moody, Esq.
Thomas H. Means, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
*********************

HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

-vs-

CV 87-2408

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant.
*********************

The Court, having reserved the issue of attorney's fees
in this matter will rule, and will award the plaintiff $1,000.00
based on need and the relative ability of the parties to pay.
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare an order incorporating
the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to filing with the Court for signature.
Dated this 31st day of July, 1989.
BY

cc:

Thomas H. Means, Esq,
Robert L. Moody, Esq,

1

FILED IN
4 TH D!STR:OI oourj
STA17 '' % ",' !Tt .;i

CCT 5

4:5?;;'89

THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222
Attorney for Plaintiff
3 63 North University Avenue
Suite 103
P.O. Box 2283
Provo, Utah, 84 603
[801] 377-7980

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

]
)

FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

No. CV 87 2408

V

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

;

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means. Defendant also appeared
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L.
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter,
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter
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under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now
hereby enters the following

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior
thereto.
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 Octobei:, 1984, in
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 1976, who
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short
period when Plaintiff's mobile home was situated at 155 South 1200
West, Orem, Utah.
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist.
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on
or about 10 November, 1987.
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or
about May, 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home
has been the minorfs only home.
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial.
8. During the parties1 marriage Plaintiff has been an employee
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately
one year.
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either
in the form alimony or child support.
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10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized.
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated.
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports
such finding is as follows:
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4
December, 1978.
b. At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 12 00 West,
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile
sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when not on
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile
home.
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name,
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove', Utah. At that
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same time the parties moved Plaintifffs mobile home onto that pad
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections.
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the
realty as her residence.
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling,
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of outbuildings and a metal building.
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the
realty.
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain
Plaintiff and her daughter.
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h. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission,
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile
accident•
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended
school under Defendant's family name of Walters.
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state
income tax returns as 62 5 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980,
1981, 1982, and 1983.
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and
1984.
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties'
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage.
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00.
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether
6

these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account.
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of
four parcels of realty, to wit:
a. Parcel 1625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is
located Plaintifffs aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot
Concord.
b. Parcel 2640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home.
c. Parcel 36072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
d. Parcel 474 6 West 600 North, Orem, Utah
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977,
7

reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately
$5,000.00.
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Court f s acceptance into
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser.
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreaux's assessment of the valuations
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for
the following reasons:
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to
each parcel.
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Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements,
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout,
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion,
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties,
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost,
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties.
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor,
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association.
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit:
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home:
9

$20,000.00

Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home:

$2 0,000.00

Parcel 3, with improvements:

$10,000.00

15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of the retirement
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant, 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App
1987). The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant
was in such employment."
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance
affecting the property at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for
which either party is liable either jointly or individually,
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980
Chrysler automobile.
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties1 1979
Chevrolet pick-up truck.
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as
opposed to property accumulated during the parties1 marital
relationship.
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20. Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000.00
for attorneyfs fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint.
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees.

12

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her
marriage to Defendant.
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his
marriage to Plaintiff.
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other.
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty
situated at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow.
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987.
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing $400.00
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the
remainder of each account.
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7. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff.
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship
that existed between the parties both prior to and after
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of
the monitory values of the properties.
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty,
improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 South 50 West,
14

Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate
property the parties' 1980 Chrysler automobile.
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate
property the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck.
11. It is proper that the parties1 personalty as noted in
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds
therefrom divided equally between them.
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v
Marchant. 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff's proportionate share
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter,
15

(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement,
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion
of Defendant's refund based upon the above-noted fraction.
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth
hereinabove.
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her
reasonable attorney's fees the sum of $1000.00.
Dated this t?

day of -At*gsst, 1989.

Approved as to form:

16

Robert L. Moody
Attorney for Defendant
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grantee
for the sum of
. . DOLLARS,

117 West Pacific Drive American Fork Utah
Ten Dollars and other valuable consideration-

the following described tract
State of Utah:

oi land in

County,

Utah

All of Lot 9. Plat "D" Pleasant grove mobile home estates,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, • according to the official plat thereof
on file in the office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah.
Subject to Restrictive Covenants recorded December 9, 1971,
as Entry No. 16651, in Book 1251, at Page 395 of the
Offical Records cr. Utah County, Utah.
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Vera L. Walters

^

-

in iM PoC'Gc DKof

Anerican Pork, Utah

>u-/

, County of

•"•*"

Utah

State of Utah

for the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable considerations—-DOLLARS,

the following described tract of land in

Utah

County, State of Utah, to-wit:

Lot 11, Plat "D", Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates

WITNESS the hand of said grantor .this

31

day of

Signed in the presence ot

>

County of

J ***

On the
31
personally Appeared before me
the signer
same.

day of

,*\ . C

: r o"~"'•''

March

, 19 89

Lewis M. Walters
of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
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y
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Lewis **M*. Walters
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WARRANTY DEED
of American Fork
CONVEY and WARRANT

LEVIS MARK WALTERS
.County of
Utah
to

grantor
, State of Utah, hereby

STAN SAPP

of

grantee
for the sum of
- DOLLARS,

775 North 300 East, Pleasant Grove, Utah
-Ten Dollars and other valuable consideration

the following described tract
State of Utah:

o* land in -

County.

Utah

Commencing 10 Chains west and 583 feet north fron the southeast
corner of the southwest quarter of Section 2, Township 5 South,
Range 1 F.ast, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence west 132 feet;
thence north 110 feet;thence east 132 feet; thence south
110 feet to point of beginning.

WITNESS, the hand
February

of said grantor , this
: : •• , A. D. 19 89

day of

28th

J2^

Signed in the Presence of

Lewis

Mark

Walters

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

UTAH

On the
28th
day of
personally appeared before me L e w - s

February
Mark

, A. D. 1989

W a l t e r s

the signer.l>pf the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
'same*— '*] \ V

he

executed the

7ft^-^ 3t(Z&rNotary Public.
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TOME COPY OF THE ORIGINAL RECORDED DOCUMENT • THE
OFFICIAL RECORD iN MY OFFICE AS THE SAME APPEARS IN
BOOK

z^y
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WITNESS MY HAND AND ZpAL OF tAlO OFFICE THIS

*?*S*

DAY OF
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THOMAS H. MEANS
Attorney for Pla int i ff
81 East Center
P.O. Box 2283
Provo, Utah, 84
[801] 377-7980

IN THE FOl

JUDICIAL DISTRK

OURT OF UTAH COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,.
v

;I

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT CF
ATTORNEY'S FEES

;

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

;
]

STATE OF TTTAr

County
Y -:r; ' '

,

aeposes as follows:

1. My name is Thomas •* * run; ' :;> •; a* torne, . :• good
standing, 1icensed L>V t ho ntah State Dcir
^Vt* * .'.
presented :

11

I •'

->\ji'i ..; i - -. .

h^ i^.iqaiiwi

: .:«.- character

:.. - action.

-iLtorney of record for the party as indicated above.

i

3. In my capacity as attorney of record for such party I have
reviewed the file and record of this matter, have consulted with my
client and others, have advised my client by telephone and office
visits, have prepared and filed pleadings, have discovered the
facts attendant to the issues, and have appeared in a
representative capacity for and with my client at each and all
hearings as may be indicated by the file of this matter.
Specifically, actions necessitated by the exigencies of this matter
include the following:
Ex Parte Motions for Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunction, and Order to Show Cause,
Affidavits and Temporary Restraining Order and Order to
Show Cause, meetings and consultation with Sheriff,
Hearing of Order To Show Cause, Stipulation, Preliminary
Injunction, Order, consultation with Pleasant Grove
detective and Pleasant Grove City Attorney regarding
Defendant's first violation of Temporary Restraining
Order, pre-trial hearing, Pre-Trial Order, Affidavits in
support of and second Motion for Order to Show Cause,
second Order to Show Cause, hearing on second Order to
Show Cause,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and

Judgment Upon Order to Show Cause, consultation with
Pleasant Grove Police and Utah County Attorney regarding
2

Uetendant " i\ second violation of Preliminary Injunction,
three sets of Plaintiff's Interrogatories, and
Certif icates ol Servici (, I hi

"

"

*'•

"

Defendant f s Interrogatories, rev iew oi records o t Utah
County Recorder, four Lis Pendens
\\ i I hi 11 ni |

[Mil

if

11 i 1 i

'M 1

telephone

i

*•

^nsultation

_>u - '

;. : a n w i t h

real estate appraiser,, telephone conspiration with banks
and credit union regarding accounts, multiple meetings
c 11 i< I c: c: i 1 su] tati oi is A i 11 i :i i ivesti g a t o rr research of case
law, Subpoenas for records and appearances {d
consultatic
i eder.il I i

vith Alpine School District
*:o nrivacy 1 .tw

I : CA

, telephone

^^^i •.•••

Sect .un i.-:.-,. iai ] and

Motion to Compel for response t. Subpoena, consultation
with parties' tax prep.i -*-:

\ •.

- *• - : • iii! ' ". lvr,\

* , i :. w Release of Lis

i etui: lis, tr i a ] preparat^ci,

Pendens, drafts of final Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, Decree of Divorce, Qualified Domestic Relations
Order, Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees,

4

\ : <.

.a h services,

consultations, and representations at the rate of $60,00 per hour.

3

5. I have dedicated 77,52 hours to date in representation of
my client in this matter.

6. As per said fee agreement, and through 19 March, 198 9, my
client has incurred the following expenses in this action:
attorney fees
advances-service costs
filing fees
recorders fees
witness fees
accounting costs
investigations
appraisals
total

$4651.00
27.00
87.00
40.00
14.00
32.00
500.00
450.00
$5801.00

7. To date my client has expended $1782.00 toward the abovenoted expenses of this action.

8. The present unpaid balance of the expenses of this action
is $4019.00 all of which balance constitutes unpaid attorney's
fees.

9. I believe such rate and such total fees at this stage of
the proceedings to be reasonable, given the amount in controversy,
the time necessarily expended by me in the matter, the relative
complexity of the matter, and the comparable rates charged and time
that would likely be dedicated to such representation by other
4

competent attorneys 1 icensed t o pra* :l. i».''.' in "' hi.s do'Utrt, •' 1 n < I I
further believe the various actions taken in Plaintiff's behalf in
the prosecution of her cl ai ms have been reasonable, necessary,
supported by good • ::ai ise , a i 1 d i 1 c • t f i:i :::

rought in ha.-; -

:

11h

nor for delay nor" harassment.

1 , n M -M--.it rni j mi | MM,

mil be as set: lorth in a Supplemental

Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, if appropriate.

11 , Your affi an t proffers that Plaintiff is totally selfsupported from income earned from her present employment at Geneva
Steel, that in addition

J

;

*

*• '

-

. •: ^

Jl

ihle

for I :I ii = s ti ytal support n; .;._-: daughter Shirley Schantell Hunter
(Walters) whom she has custody of. and ;- - partially supporti ng
another id1"11

' Mi'ihh»i

,
- ,IHJI.»

-.-•-.. * L t h

Plaintif 1 . *,.., maintains part-time employmen4

*;r:;

ianitorial

service, an./, wh*. :;.-, afflicted wit!" a disease wnicn \ '-=>•-* •**
prevents
aicne,

I.'

.

time employment and frjn; living
^

-uiiidin-Barre Syndrome.

I Nit.? 1. rial 1.11 I; his matter Plaintiff gave testimony of

her total gross income for 1988. It is your affiant's recollection
that said total was $26,

».

13. The legal basis for an award of attorney's fees is Section
30-3-3, Utah Code and the established law regarding awards of
attorney's fees in actions for divorce as set forth in decisions
such as Kerr v Kerr. 610 P2nd 1380, Beals v Beals, 682 P2nd 862,
Cabrera v Cottrel. 694 P2nd 622, Tallev v Tallev, 739 P2nd 83,
Newmeyer v Newmeyer. 745 P2nd 1276, Porco v Porco, 752 P2nd 365,
Rasband v Rasband. 752 P2nd 1313, Aspar v Aspar 753 P2nd 978,
Andersen v Andersen. 757 P2nd 476, Sorensen v Sorensen, 102 UAR 14,
and Mauahan v Mauahan, 102 UAR 44. I believe Plaintiff justly
deserves an award of attorney's fees and that such award to
Plaintiff is supported by the facts and circumstances of this
matter and the statute and decisions above cited.

Dated this 'TO

day of

I^Y^c

fr^

1989

ldinas H
Thomas
H. Means
Affiant

Attorney for Plaintiff

6

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
On t h e

Jr

dav of

MftfZCf-i

1989, p e r s o n a ] ; /

he *

.»• Kin "M» I ' viijGd

oxecul

appeared
i ; , « , * In

foregoing Affidavit.

Notary Public
(seal)
My commission expires:

Resi
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date below-noted
he/she served a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT on the following, in the manner prescribed by Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure No. 5(b)(1), by either depositing the same in
the U.S. Mails, addressed as below-noted, with all postage and
other fees pre-paid, or by delivering the same to the following
person[s] personally, or by delivering the same to a person of
suitable age and discretion at the address[es] below-noted.
Dated this

day of ^L^l/i/j

, 1990.

UTAH C0URTrt)F APPEALS
230 South 500 East
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102
ROBERT L. MOODY
Attorney for Appellant
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah, 84 604

